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Abstract
Background: In 2012 the Norwegian Coordination Reform was implemented. The main motivation was to encourage
municipalities to expand local, primary health care services. From 2012 to 2014, under the Municipal Co-Financing regime,
municipalities were obliged to cover 20 % of the costs of health services provided at the specialist (hospital) level.
Importantly, use of rehabilitation services in private institutions was not part of the cost-sharing mechanism of Municipal
Co-Financing. Rehabilitation services may be seen as quite similar in nature whether they be provided by municipalities,
hospitals or private institutions. Thus, with rehabilitation patients readily “transferrable” between levels, the question is
whether the reform brought with it a sought after shift towards more municipal rehabilitation and less specialist
rehabilitation.
Methods: Data from the Norwegian Patient Register and from Statistics Norway/KOSTRA were utilized to gauge annual
expenditures and inputs in specialist, municipal and private institution rehabilitation services respectively. Fixed effects and
first difference regression analyses for the period 2010–2013 were carried out to account for certain time-invariant traits of
municipalities and/or hospital regions, and results were adjusted for contemporaneous trends in local needs.
Results: Expenditures in specialist rehabilitation services declined sharply (typically by 8–10 %) from 2011 (pre-reform) to
2012 (post-reform), while expenditures in private rehabilitation services rose markedly in the same period (typically by
42–44 %). The results do not suggest any general expansion of municipal rehabilitation services.
Conclusions: The results of the analyses suggest that municipalities shift away from the use of specialist rehabilitation
services and towards the use of rehabilitation services in private institutions since the latter becomes relatively cheaper
(free-of charge) than both municipal and specialist services in post-reform periods (as specialist services come at a cost to
municipalities post-reform). While the main goal of the reform has not materialized the results nevertheless suggest that
incentives (of cost-shifting) do play a significant role in rehabilitation service use.
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care coordination, Municipal co-financing
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Background
Norwegian Coordination Reform and rehabilitation
services
Implemented in 2012, the main goal of the Norwegian
Coordination Reform (CR) [1]1 was to reduce overall
health care costs and facilitate the coordination of the
primary and specialist levels of the Norwegian health
care system. Coordination difficulties often follow finan-
cial and regulatory divisions between specialist and pri-
mary health care [2]. This is also the case in Norway,
where the provision of specialist and primary health care
services is at different organizational levels and financed
through different budgets, a condition particularly pro-
nounced in rehabilitation services. The subsequent div-
ision of responsibilities between the specialist and
primary health care level within rehabilitation has been
described as unclear [3], in the sense that both levels
maintain much the same rehabilitation capabilities and
competencies. Moreover, as both municipalities—charged
with primary health care responsibilities—and specialist
health care hospital regions are reasonably well suited to
provide such services, the incentives to shift costs onto
the other part perhaps constitutes the core “coordination
problem” in this area.
In this way, the case of rehabilitation services consti-
tutes something of a litmus test for the CR in terms of
the prospects for simple coordination. For instance, a
finding that the reform has not had the expected effect
on these services, i.e. a decline in specialist rehabilitation
and an increase in primary rehabilitation, would high-
light a serious shortcoming of the reform. This is not ne-
cessarily because the reform was tailored specifically for
rehabilitation services, but rather because this is where
the potential for simple coordination should be particu-
larly evident.
An important feature of the CR was Municipal Co-
Financing (MCF). Under this provision, lasting from 2012
to 2014, municipalities were obligated to cover 20 % of the
costs associated with a given set of medical Diagnostic-
Related Groups (DRGs), including hospital rehabilitation
services. The overall motivation for introducing co-
financing was that it would provide municipalities with an
incentive to expand (primary) health care provided at the
municipal level, in the hope that this in turn would lessen
the need for more expensive specialist health care, and
thereby reduce overall health costs and improve health out-
comes [3, 4]. In addition, because it adheres to the Lowest
Effective Level (LEL) of care principle, and because munici-
palities may naturally integrate local medical services with
other municipal social and care services, any growth at this
level would be particularly beneficial [3, 4].
In this article, we analyze the effects of MCF on the
use of both specialist and primary level rehabilitation
services, along with its effects on the procurement of
rehabilitation services in private institutions. Importantly,
there has always been in Norway a relatively small private
sector offering rehabilitation services. Equally important,
the use of private rehabilitation services was, somewhat
peculiarly, exempt from the MCF scheme (i.e. the con-
tinuation of financing through hospital revenues). The
role of private rehabilitation institutions has thus been
somewhat politically controversial, and strong incentives
for the municipalities to expand their own services could
undermine the need for these private sector institutions.
In any case, we would expect that at least initially private
rehabilitation services would expand under the MCF re-
gime owing to municipal preferences for “free-of-charge”
services, insofar as private services may really substitute
for services provided by hospitals and/or by municipalities
themselves. In the ensuing analyses, we employ regression
analysis using annual municipal-level aggregated data
from the Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR) [5] (providing
data on specialist level and private rehabilitation expendi-
tures) and the Municipality-State-Reporting information
system (KOSTRA) [6] (providing data on local health ser-
vice resources and local demographics) over the period
2010–2013.
The article is organized as follows. To start, we briefly
place our research questions within the broader research
field dealing with the relationship between the primary
and specialist level health care sectors, and describe the
overall Norwegian institutional setting, with a particular
emphasis on the specifics of the CR and MCF regime.
Subsequently, we develop hypotheses concerning the ex-
pected demand for rehabilitation services at different
levels, both pre- and postreform, as this is responsive to
both changes in (i) (demographic) needs, and (ii) to
(pre- and postreform) service prices. The following sec-
tions then present our data and empirical strategy, and
the results from the statistical analyses. In the regression
analysis, we trace the changes in demand for different
rehabilitation services, employing both fixed effects and
first-difference specifications in order to account for
local heterogeneity over the period of study. Although
we cannot rule out that changes in the use of different
rehabilitation services are in fact the result of other con-
founding factors, we do believe that the introduction of
the MCF regime is the most important contemporan-
eous driving force, and our analyses gives us some lee-
way in evaluating the impact of confounding trends due
to other factors. We discuss our findings and their impli-
cations before providing concluding remarks.
The relationship between health care levels, the
Norwegian institutional setting, and the CR: implications
for rehabilitation services
Often described as a decentralized National Health Ser-
vice (NHS)-type system, the fundamental features of the
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Norwegian health care system resemble those of the UK
NHS, although Norwegian municipalities play a rela-
tively more important role than do their UK counter-
parts. For example, the responsibility for Long Term
Care (LTC) services and community health services lies
at the municipal level. Provision of general practitioner
(GP) services is also a municipal responsibility, although
GPs are usually not municipal employees as such. Ra-
ther, they are independent service providers operating in
a contractual relationship with the municipalities [7].2
For their part, the revenues of the municipalities consist
of block grants from the central state, taxes on personal
income and wealth, and other specific grants, such as
grants to municipalities in rural areas. There is the redis-
tribution of tax income among municipalities to reduce
inequalities, and the most important part of the block
grant is a per capita component adjusted for centrality
and inequalities in the demand for services. Thus, the
design of the system serves to adjust for municipal needs
and factors affecting the ability of municipalities to de-
liver services.
For the most part, the financing of somatic specialist
health care is through a combination of an adjusted per
capita-based block grant and Activity-Based Financing
(ABF) based on the DRGs. Even though the Regional
Health Authorities (RHAs) are free to choose the model
they deem best for financing hospitals in their catch-
ment area, all have opted for the same model as the cen-
tral state uses to fund the RHAs themselves.
Consequently, while the ABF share of the total funding
of specialist health care has varied between 40 and 60 %
over the last 15 years, in the shorter more recent period
under study (2010–2013), it has remained at 40 %
throughout.
Introduced in 2012, the CR’s main elements were: (i)
MCF, whereby the municipalities had to cover 20 % of
the running hospital costs for medical DRGs; (ii) a dis-
charge arrangement where municipalities were charged
NOK 4000 per day from when a patient was classified as
ready for discharge by the hospital; and (iii) new munici-
pal acute bed units (MAUs). The MAUs are intermedi-
ate units introduced to reduce use acute admissions to
hospitals. By law, both RHAs and municipalities must
have a unit responsible for the coordination of rehabili-
tation services. Municipalities are also required to devise
individual plans for each patient/user in need of long-
term care and to provide coordinated health services [8].
One of the primary goals of these regulations concerning
rehabilitation was to strengthen coordination within
both the primary and specialist levels, as well as between
the two levels. The integration of health and social care
is at the municipal level, and this, in combination with
the proximity of local authorities to users, means that
municipalities are well suited to provide high-quality
“low-tech” rehabilitation services. Moreover, in the white
paper first introducing the CR, the then Minister of
Health stressed in the foreword the importance of enab-
ling the municipalities to provide rehabilitation services
[4]. In other words, there are clear arguments in favor of
an increase in the use of municipal rehabilitation, both
as far as quality and costs are concerned.
Furthermore, we have argued that rehabilitation ser-
vices rendered at different levels (specialist, municipal,
and private) are “substitutable” in a very simple fashion.
Numerous studies show that primary health care inter-
ventions, seen as preventive interventions, may have
positive effects in terms of better long-term health out-
comes and lower overall health care costs [9]. Neverthe-
less, such studies, and associated recommendations, will
typically point to gains from the substitution of simpler
primary care interventions for costly and complex treat-
ment at later stages, i.e. gains in terms of better health
outcomes and/or lower overall health costs only secured
after some time [9–16].
In contrast, when analyzing the use of rehabilitation
services at different levels, we look at the substitution of
quite similar services across levels, which may or may
not have effects in terms of better outcomes in the lon-
ger run. In other words, the focus of the analysis is on
services that are easily shifted between levels and should
be strengthened at the municipal level (given municipal
services have certain qualities), but that might not shift
in this fashion given the peculiarities of regulation, fi-
nancing regime, and reform design. This facilitates the
analysis of potential incentive effects, such as those
stemming from the MCF, and ensures that other more
“medical”-related coordination problems (e.g. the correct
ratio of heart surgery to exercise) are less of a concern.
In sum, both the apparent political significance of the re-
habilitation area and certain simplifying aspects of the
area itself serve to motivate the importance of the
analysis.
Before the CR, use of specialist rehabilitation services
was ostensibly “free of charge” for municipalities. With
the reform from 2012 onward, and following the intro-
duction of MCF, municipalities were required to cover
20 % of all specialist-level health care costs. The main
motivation for this was to provide municipalities with an
incentive to expand their own services, including re-
habilitation services. Lastly, as noted earlier, nonprofit
private rehabilitation institutions play an important role
in the institutional configuration of rehabilitation ser-
vices in Norway. Importantly, the MCF scheme did not
cover the use of private rehabilitation, with its financing
continuing through hospital block grants.
We now hypothesize about the incentive effects in the
pre- and postreform periods. These, of course, do not
necessarily reflect the aspirations of the reform. The first
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issue concerns the likely patterns of service provision
demand as we change from the pre- to the postreform
period. As the use of private rehabilitation providers is
“free of charge” for municipalities, with costs covered
through hospital block grants—and given both the use of
(postreform) specialist rehabilitation and that the expan-
sion of own capabilities comes at a cost—we expect mu-
nicipal demands for private rehabilitation services to
increase at the expense of their demands for specialist
and municipal rehabilitation. In addition, we would ex-
pect that the demand for municipal provision would not
increase much in absolute terms regardless. Even if there
are certain intrinsic qualities regarding municipal ser-
vices compared with specialist and private services, the
former are likely considered “too expensive” vis-à-vis
readily available alternatives, i.e. specialist services at
what is likely a fraction of the cost (80 % of the specialist
service price at any rate), and free private services.3
Before we turn to a description of the data and the
empirical analyses, we briefly consider that the hypoth-
eses developed above focus on municipal incentives.
While such a focus is in line with the “official” working
mechanism of the reform, we also believe this is appro-
priate for two reasons. First, municipal incentives change
dramatically and clearly as the reform sets in and as de-
scribed. In contrast, hospitals are only partly able to
maximize disposable revenues and/or minimize outlays.
However, if hospitals prefer long-term “major activity”,
they will certainly favor a situation where municipalities
purchase specialist services, insofar as specialist DRG
prices are accurate. Conversely, they will most disfavor
the situation where municipalities demand private re-
habilitation, as this will also deplete current disposable
funds (that nearly match activity-based refunds—recall
that private rehabilitation is not part of the ABF system).
Given the limited incentives of hospitals, with their
largely refund-based financing system, in the following
analyses and interpretations, we focus on municipal in-
centives. Moreover, it should be clear from the discus-
sion that a finding in accordance with the main
hypotheses outlined above (dealing with municipal in-
centives) is in fact a conservative one (given that hospital
incentives should drive patterns in the opposite direc-
tion). In addition, the analyses also offer controls for cer-
tain invariant characteristics of hospitals as well as
municipalities and private service providers (e.g. rigid
capacity limits).
Municipalities can act on their incentives in three
ways. First, although the relationship between the muni-
cipality and the GP is contractual (the vast majority of
GPs are contractors), the municipality likely has some
influence over the GP’s decisions. Second, they can
prioritize sending patients that come from the hospital
to a private rehabilitation hospital, rather than providing
municipal services or using public hospital services.
Third, they can refer patients who have received care in
the new MAUs who are in need of further rehabilitation
to private institutions and public hospitals or municipal
rehabilitation.
A final point is that in analyzing the changes in the
patterns of rehabilitation service provision, we should
naturally adjust for possibly confounding changes in
local health care needs during the period of study (prox-
ied by local demographics in our study). Thus, a natural,
albeit auxiliary, set of hypotheses is that changes in ser-
vice levels should be less sensitive to needs when ser-
vices are costly. In other words, we expect that needs
variables are more important predictors of specialist re-
habilitation use before the reform than after the reform.
This is also an effect of the relative prices of the different




In the empirical analyses, we use aggregate data from
the Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR) recording (i) an-
nual municipality-level utilization of six specialist re-
habilitation DRGs and (ii) annual municipality-level use
of private rehabilitation services (24 h stays) over the
period 2010–2013.4 We calculate
(i) the annual costs of specialist rehabilitation DRGs per
capita in each municipality by annually aggregating
individual DRG diagnoses multiplied by the annual
DRG weight attached to each DRG type multiplied
by the annual DRG price5 [17] and dividing by the
annual average municipal population;
(ii)the annual costs of private rehabilitation services per
capita in each municipality by annually aggregating
individual stays in private rehabilitation institutions
multiplied by the average price per stay (NOK 2886
in 2012) and dividing by the annual average
municipal population.6
As a measure of the level of municipal rehabilitation
services, we use Statistics Norway/KOSTRA records on
annual man-hours for physio- and ergotherapists in mu-
nicipal employment, and calculate
(iii) the annual municipal sum of man-hours worked by
physio- and ergotherapists per capita by dividing
total man-hours by the annual average municipal
population [18].7
To compare the level of service costs over time and
the cost sensitivities to local needs and resources, we de-
flate the measure of DRG use using the Norwegian
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Consumer Price Index [19]. Thus, the costs presented in
the tables and analyses are in 2010 NOK (or its log).
In addition, we use data from Statistics Norway for the
period 2010–2013 to gauge local levels of rehabilitation
needs [20]. Specifically, we use the annual municipal popu-
lation shares of 67–79 year-olds and those 80 years old and
over as measures of local needs. This is because these
population groups will reasonably require the most exten-
sive health care, including rehabilitation services. We also
employ a measure of reported local crime rates (per 10,000
inhabitants), and the rate of deaths per capita as proxies for
local living conditions. This is because lower living condi-
tions will reasonably entail heavier use of health services,
including rehabilitation services. Additionally, we extract
from the KOSTRA data the annual local population to cal-
culate the per capita rates of the service-level variables
(i)–(iii) above. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the
409 municipalities with valid values for these variables.8
The most apparent pattern in Table 1 is the sharp de-
cline in the use of specialist rehabilitation services from
an average of NOK 252 per inhabitant in 2010 (prere-
form) to NOK 200 in 2013 (a 20 % decline). In addition,
the use of rehabilitation services in private institutions
increases dramatically over the same period, from NOK
18 per inhabitant in 2010 to NOK 29 in 2013, i.e. the
average increases by a staggering 61 %.
Conversely, man-hour inputs in municipal rehabilitation
services increase only from 3.73 per 10,000 inhabitants in
Table 1 Descriptive statistics. Service use and municipal needs levels. By year (2010–2013). N = 409.a
Variable Year Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Specialist level (hospital) rehabilitation
services (2010 NOK per inabitant)b
2010 251.84 123.81 34.78 1137.12
2011 239.71 109.56 40.17 1057.75
2012 212.38 96.01 25.40 891.81
2013 200.13 92.11 21.13 1122.35
Rehabilitation services in private
institutions (2010 NOK per inhabitant)c
2010 18.08 8.48 2.26 80.19
2011 17.61 10.94 1.67 189.63
2012 27.73 27.01 3.20 187.26
2013 29.25 23.49 2.18 179.46
Municipal rehabilitation services
(physiotherapist and ergotherapist
man-years per 10,000 inhabitants)
2010 3.74 1.87 0.05 32.00
2011 3.93 1.79 0.04 16.08
2012 4.10 1.78 0.07 23.51
2013 4.30 1.89 0.07 18.51
Share of municipal population
aged over 80
2010 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.10
2011 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09
2012 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09
2013 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.09
Share of municipal population
aged 67–79
2010 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.15
2011 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.16
2012 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.17
2013 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.18
Deaths per 1000 inahbitants 2010 8.51 2.17 3.62 22.02
2011 8.38 2.11 3.03 21.12
2012 8.38 2.20 3.53 20.42
2013 8.14 2.17 3.90 22.73
Reported crimes per 10,000
inahbitants
2010 79.50 36.52 11.40 210.20
2011 76.68 36.03 10.80 208.90
2012 75.29 36.07 9.40 205.40
2013 74.77 35.85 10.70 234.80
Source: Norwegian Patient Registry and Statistics Norway
a Results weighted by municipal population
b Comprises DRG-462A: Complex rehabilitation, DRG-462B: Ordinary rehabilitation, DRG-462C: Other rehabilitation, DRG-462O: Unspecified rehabilitation, DRG-
932O: Policinic rehabilitation and DRG-998O: Group based patient recovery
c annually aggregated individual stays in privat rehabilitation institutions times average price-per-stay (NOK 2886 in 2012)
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2010 to 4.30 per 10,000 inhabitants in 2013 (i.e. an in-
crease of 15 %). The empirical question is whether these
results hold when we adjust for contemporaneous trends
in local needs and look specifically at the patterns within
the typical municipality (by way of fixed-effects and first-
difference model specifications).
Model specification
As we wish to trace the changes in the use of different
rehabilitation services, we estimate variants of the fol-
lowing panel (fixed effects) model:










γkc ⋅ log Needscitð Þ þ εkit
ð1Þ
That is, we estimate a set of k = 3 equations where y is a
particular measure of rehabilitation service use (k = special-
ist, private, municipal) in municipality i in year t (t = 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013); and needs is a vector of c = 4 municipal
needs variables (c = two measures of shares of elderly, death
rates and crime rates), with γ a vector of associated parame-
ters. The inclusion of indicators for N = 409 municipalities,
i.e. the Mun indicator variables, means that we effectively
control for any traits of municipalities—or the relationship
between the individual municipality and the health
region—that are stable over the relevant period (such as
stable capacity constraints, say). In addition, we estimate
the equations in terms of logs of the variables, so that we
may interpret effects as elasticities, and so as to get at a
more reasonable and normal scale for measured changes
in outcomes in particular: As can be seen in Table 1, out-
come levels (i.e. rehabilitation service use) are (naturally)
heavily skewed to the right, while this is also so, although
less pronounced, for the needs variables.9 The tendency
for distributions to be right-skewed also applies to relative
changes in variables (not shown), and a log-
transformation (of change rates) seems to remedy such
problems considerably: As can be seen in Additional file 1:
Table S1, minimum and maximum values of log-
transformed changes seem to be distanced quite symmet-
rically around their mean values.
Much of the “distributional concerns” discussed above
also have to do with the fact that municipalities are pre-
dominantly small in Norway10 and population rates of use
of rehabilitation services are in themselves relatively small.
This causes the variables (the dependent variables in par-
ticular) to be poorly measured as “substantive changes” in
quite many of the observations. Specifically, variable values
in most cases, i.e. in the smaller localities, will reflect large
changes due to quite random movements of very few
individuals (in and out of age groups, in and out of muni-
cipal employment). Thus, when reporting descriptive
statistics and when estimating the equations, we
weight observations (it, municipality-years) by the
average annual municipal population, and interpreta-
tions are in terms of effects for the “average sized
municipality” (around 12,000 inhabitants in 2012).
Our primary interest lies in the estimates of the αT coef-
ficients, i.e. the effects associated with the YearTindicator
variables (T = 2011, 2012, 2013, with 2010 the refer-
ence category). Although we are not able to take ac-
count of all other possible factors that coincide with
the reform, other than changes in municipal needs
and time-invariant municipal characteristics, we can
think of no other systematic factor that should drive
service use in a particular direction during the period
under study. Accordingly, we interpret the αT as “re-
form effects”.
Results
We present results from the estimation of variants of
equation (1) in Table 2. First, in models without covari-
ates, i.e. models (A), we estimate significantly different
service levels in reform years (2012 and 2013) as com-
pared to the reference year (2010). For example, as com-
pared to levels in 2010, average use of specialist services
decreases by 14 % by 2012 and by 20 % by 2013.11 Con-
versely, the use of rehabilitation services in private insti-
tutions increases sharply in the same manner, while
there is less pronounced increase in the use of municipal
services. Joint tests of the differences between 2011 and
2012 levels, which may be interpreted as the adjustment
going into the reform, reveal that effects in all service
sectors are substantial and highly significant.12 On the
other hand, levels do not change substantively or signifi-
cantly in the pre-reform period from 2010 to 2011, save
for municipal rehabilitation services.13 Moreover, joint
tests of differences between levels in 2012 and 2013, i.e.
within the reform, are smaller than changes from 2011
to 2012, suggesting that there is little adjustment both
before and after the reform, but some adjustment going
into the reform.14
In the next column (B) we add needs levels (Needsc) in
the individual municipality-year, since service use should
arguably be affected by changes in needs. We observe
that needs—in the form of shares of elderly people—are
positively, but not significantly, related to use of special-
ist and municipal service levels, but negatively related to
use of rehabilitation services in private institutions.
Likely, this reflects that specialist rehabilitation, more
than rehabilitation in private institutions, is to some ex-
tent more attuned to the needs of the elderly. Regard-
less, estimated αT largely retain their previous values,
suggesting that there are pronounced “reform effects”.
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Next, in models (C) we apply instrumental vari-
ables (IV) estimation, instrumenting the two elderly
shares variables and the death rate variable by their
lagged values from three years back. The idea is that
a straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) speci-
fication, as in model variants (A) and (B), will give
biased estimates of needs effects, since there is most
likely some reverse causality in the relationship be-
tween needs and service use. Specifically, a particular
pattern of service use, induced by the CR, say, might
arguably influence the survival of inhabitants and
demographics as such (young vs. elderly) in the indi-
vidual municipality.
Thus, observed correlations between needs and
service use may not reflect a true causal effect from
the former to the latter. Moreover, since the men-
tioned needs variables are likely endogenous in this
way, not only will estimates for needs effects be
biased, effect estimates for other explanatory vari-
ables that are correlated with needs—for example
year effects—will also be biased. Our argument for
the IV specification is that previous needs levels in
part determine present needs (death rates and demo-
graphics), but not current service use, which is
plausibly determined systematically by present needs
only. Results for IV estimations are presented in col-
umn (C) of Table 2.15
From the estimations of model variant (C), as com-
pared to (A) and (B), we observe that the positive CR
effects, i.e. year effects, are somewhat more pronounced
in the case of private rehabilitation services—with α2012
estimtates increasing from around 0.26 to 0.32; that the
negative CR effect in specialist services is somewhat
attenuated—with the estimated α2012 dropping from
−0.15 to−0.11; and that the positive effect in municipal
rehabilitation services shifts to a negative, albeit not sig-
nificant, effect. In addition, the negative effects of shares
of elderly mentioned above become more pronounced
and highly significant. Despite this however, joint tests of
the αT estimates reveal that the pattern of pre- and post-
reform non-adjustment and reform adjustment (from
2011 to 2012) stays much the same as in model specifi-
cations (A) and (B).16
These results are in line with the hypothesized pattern
in the previous discussion: Municipalities shift use to-
wards services that become relatively less costly. For ease
of exposition, we illustrate the results from the analyses
in model (C), i.e. from joint tests of αT estimates, in
Fig. 1. Here, annual predicted changes in the use of the
different rehabilitation service types are plotted along
time (year). The pattern clearly suggests that municipal-
ities adjust their use of rehabilitation services towards
those that become cheaper (i.e. towards private services
going into the MCF reform in 2012) and away from
those that get costlier (i.e. away from specialist services
in the same period).
As a final robustness check, we estimate effects in a
first-differenced specification:
Table 2 Use of rehabilitation services. OLS (models A and B) and IV (model C) regressions with municipality fixed effects. N = 1636.a
Use of specialist level (hospital)
rehabilitation services (log)
Use of rehabilitation services in private
institutions (log)
Use of municipal rehabilitation
services (log)
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Year2011 (=1) −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.07 −0.06 −0.04 0.07 *** 0.05 ** 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Year2012 (=1) −0.15 *** −0.15 *** −0.11 ** 0.25 *** 0.27 *** 0.32 *** 0.12 *** 0.06 * −0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
Year2013 (=1) −0.22 *** −0.21 *** −0.15 0.34 *** 0.36 *** 0.47 *** 0.18 *** 0.07 −0.13
(0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.15)
Share of pop. 67–79 (log) 0.04 −0.96 −0.52 −2.97 * 1.40 ** 3.81 **
(0.48) (1.11) (0.63) (1.74) (0.63) (1.71)
Share of pop.80+ (log) 0.36 0.96 −0.86 −4.60 *** 0.21 1.29
(0.29) (1.01) (0.80) (1.69) (0.45) (1.58)
Deaths per inhab. (log) 0.02 −0.70 −0.02 0.85 0.05 −1.55
(0.07) (1.04) (0.10) (1.44) (0.09) (1.39)
Reported crimes per inhab. (log) 0.04 −0.02 0.13 0.05 −0.16 −0.10
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
R2 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.79
a Results weighted by municipal population. All regressions include municipality indicators (parameter estimates not shown). Reference year is 2010 (Y2010 = 1).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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γkcΔ log Needscitð Þk þ Δεkit
ð2Þ
The motivation for this is that error terms, εit, might
be serially correlated, and under such circumstances
first-differencing, rather than a fixed effects specification,
is a better choice [21, 22].17 Results are shown in Table 3.
Bearing in mind that the αT effects are now estimates of
changes directly, or differences in changes, rather than
levels, one observes in model variant (D) much the
same pattern as in the fixed effects analyses in model
specification (1). Specifically, there is little and insig-
nificant change in specialist service levels from 2010
to 2011, as witnessed by the intercept estimate
Fig. 1 Percentage changes from previous year in the use of rehabilitation services (needs adjusted). [Legend: Based on estimates of the αT in
equation (1), model specification (C)]
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α^0 ¼ −0:03ð Þ: However, there seems to be some sig-
nificant decrease in the use of private rehabilitation
services α^0 ¼ −0:07ð Þ and some increase in municipal
services α^0 ¼ 0:06ð Þ:
Changes going into the reform are more pro-
nounced: For instance, the change in the use of spe-
cialist rehabilitation services from 2011 to 2012 is
estimated to be α^2012 ¼ −0:09 larger than the pre-
reform change from 2010 to 2011 α^0 ¼ −0:03ð Þ: In
other words, the average 2011–2012 change in spe-
cialist rehabilitation use is estimated to be α^0 þ α^2012
¼ −0:12; which is comparable to what was found in
the fixed effects analyses shown in Table 1. Overall,
in the case of in specialist and private rehabilitation
service use, the mentioned pattern of reform adjust-
ment and pre- and post-reform non-adjustment also
prevails in the first-differenced specification.18
Lastly, in model variant (E) we allow for time-specific
needs effects, in order to test the hypothesis that muni-
cipal use of specialist rehabilitation services should be
less sensitive to needs as services become costlier.19 As
can be seen in column (E) in the analysis of specialist re-
habilitation services, the needs effects are all positive,
and significantly so for the crime rate variable.20 In
addition, as shown in Additional file 3: Table S3, the ac-
companying interaction terms are by and large negative,
and significantly so for the interaction between crime
rate variable and the indicator variable for 2012.
This is broadly in line with the hypothesis that munici-
pal use of (specialist) rehabilitation services should be
less sensitive to needs as services become costlier (as
they do in reform periods). Moreover, the pattern of re-
form adjustment and pre- and post-reform non-adjust-
ment, evaluated by joint tests of the α0 and the αT
estimates, is apparent also in the time-varying needs ef-
fects specification (E). Specifically, for specialist rehabili-
tation services there is no significant pre-reform (2010–
2011) adjustment (p = 0.37), a significant adjustment go-
ing into the reform and no (p = 0.00), and no post-
reform adjustment (p = 0.23). The pattern is the same
for use of private rehabilitation services, but with a sig-
nificant decrease pre-reform (cf. the negative and signifi-
cant, p = 0.02, α0), and there are no significant year-to-
year changes for the use of municipal rehabilitation
services.21
Discussion
While there was a pronounced focus on improving and
expanding rehabilitation services in the years preceding
the reform, its primary goal was to provide municipal-
ities with an incentive to expand their own services.
Nonetheless, the CR does not appear to have led to a
general increase in the provision of municipal rehabilita-
tion services.
Of course, we should note some possible limitations of
our study. First, our measure of municipal rehabilitation
Table 3 Use of rehabilitation services. First-difference regressions without (model D) and with (model E) time specific needs effects
(model E). N = 1227.a
Change from previous year in use of
specialist level (hospital) rehabilitation
services (log)
Change from previous year in use of
rehabilitation services in private
institutions (log)
Change from previous year in
use of municipal rehabilitation
services (log)
(D) (E) (D) (E) (D) (E)
Intercept −0.03 −0.02 −0.07 *** −0.06 ** 0.06 *** 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Year2012 (=1) −0.09 *** −0.09 ** 0.40 *** 0.42 *** −0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Year2013 (=1) −0.03 −0.02 0.16 *** 0.13 ** −0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Δ share of pop. 67–79 (log) −0.12 0.92 −0.48 −0.43 0.76 1.05
(0.49) (0.89) (0.57) (0.90) (0.79) (1.83)
Δ share of pop.80+ (log) 0.53 1.34 −0.46 0.19 −0.21 −0.74
(0.32) (0.76) (0.83) (0.63) (0.61) (1.01)
Δ deaths per inhab. (log) 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.07 −0.08
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Δ reported crimes per inhab. (log) −0.03 0.38 * 0.03 0.06 −0.13 −0.13
(0.02) (0.21) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.26)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.01
a Results weighted by municipal population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Monkerud and Tjerbo BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:353 Page 9 of 13
use is rather rough (see note 7). Future research should
attempt to acquire better data to address this point, as
the measure arguably does not encompass the full
breadth of municipal rehabilitation services. Second, as
we do not have information about the source of the pa-
tients admitted to private rehabilitation institutions, we
cannot rule out the possibility that much of the increase
stems from patients arriving from hospitals. Certainly,
the length of stay for patients in hospitals decreased
after the CR [23], although the waiting time for somatic
patients appears to have changed less [24]. Nonetheless,
a reduction in the mean LOS may also have led to a
greater share of patients arriving at private rehabilitation
institutions from public hospitals, but we do not know
to what extent this has happened.
Another mechanism introduced in the CR was dis-
charge arrangements where municipalities were charged
a fee per day for patients, in the case that they were de-
clared ready for discharge but could not be received by
the municipalities. One way for municipalities to handle
this, for example if they did not have the capacity to re-
ceive patients, was to use private rehabilitation institu-
tions. Some of the patients provided with acute care in
the new MAUs rather than in a hospital would probably
also require rehabilitation services. Unfortunately, again,
our data does not allow us to identify where patients
come from. Other elements of the CR, in particular the
new discharge arrangement, may play an important role
here. Nevertheless, municipalities appear to have vastly
increased their use of private providers of rehabilitation
services rather than expanding their own services. This
is most likely because of the relative increase in the price
for specialist rehabilitation services in the wake of the
CR. For example, with the MCF, the municipalities
would need to cover 20 % of the costs of such services
themselves. On the other hand, the use of private pro-
viders of rehabilitation services has remained free of
charge throughout, which may explain the observed
strong decline in the use of specialist rehabilitation ser-
vices as the reform set in. Thus, the reform aspirations
that would point toward local service expansion have
not occurred. Instead, local authorities have perhaps nat-
urally shifted their attention toward readily available and
cheaper alternatives (private rehabilitation services).
Increased cost sharing under the MCF regime might
have created stronger incentives for expanding munici-
pal services. Nevertheless, under such an arrangement,
municipalities would have had to handle increased risks.
Demand for services will fluctuate from year to year, and
for smaller municipalities, i.e. for smaller catchment
areas, this will often be difficult to manage [3]. In other
words, there is a trade-off between the incentives placed
on agents (municipalities) and the amount of risk
entailed. In the Norwegian context, where the
municipalities are often small and therefore particularly
susceptible to financial risk, this is a very real problem.
Consequently, one way to enhance the potential for in-
centive schemes such as MCF—but without dispropor-
tionately increasing financial risks to an unacceptable
level—would be the consolidation of local governments.
However, at present the prospects for substantial local
government structural reform in Norway do not look
good.
Reforms that rely on incentivizing mechanisms also
need to address the institutional configuration of the
system. On the one hand, much of the literature [25],
along with evaluations of the recent Danish structural
reform [26], indicates that the potential for success from
incentivizing schemes such as the MCF is low. There are
few indications of a general substitution effect. Never-
theless, rehabilitation services are arguably an area
where the potential could be greater. We find no effect
in terms of reform aims, i.e. expansion of local govern-
ment services, although there are indications that muni-
cipalities responded to financial incentives present in the
reform. With private rehabilitation services exempt from
the MCF and ABF altogether, the reform created incen-
tives for municipalities to rely on private providers, and
indeed, we observed a strong increase in the use of pri-
vate rehabilitation services. On this basis, we could
argue that providing municipalities with stronger incen-
tives to expand their own services might have worked
better to achieve reform goals. Counterfactually, the in-
clusion of private rehabilitation services in the MCF
and/or larger local governments might have led to differ-
ent patterns of rehabilitation service use. As argued, it
seems that the institutional configuration, i.e. a strong
preference for “small local government,” provides little
room for implementing cost-sharing mechanisms suffi-
ciently strong enough to have any substantial effect.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that municipalities shifted away
from the use of specialist rehabilitation services and to-
ward the use of rehabilitation services in private institu-
tions because the latter are relatively cheaper (i.e. free-of
charge) than either municipal or specialist services in
the postreform period. In addition, there is little evi-
dence of any substantial expansion of the municipal re-
habilitation service sector following from the CR and the
MCF mechanism. Since ours is a temporal field study,
and neither an experiment, nor one in which a separate
control group is available, we cannot rule out that other
unobserved confounding factors contemporaneous to
the reform are what is driving the patterns of rehabilita-
tion service use. However, to our knowledge there are
few other systematic factors correlated with the initiation
of the reform, but not stemming form the reform
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themselves, that could explain the observed patterns. In
addition, we find that pre- and post-reform trends are
largely absent, suggesting that other confounding factors,
potentially at play throughout the period of study, are not
as important as the reform itself. While our findings mean
that the main goal of the reform has not been met, the re-
sults nevertheless suggest that the cost-shifting incentives
still play a significant role in rehabilitation service use.
Endnotes
1[1] provides an English summary of the reform.
2As of May 2014, the municipalities employed 5.9 % of
GPs in the Medical Associations database. Thus, most
GPs are contractors.
3These are the preliminaries of a possible counterfac-
tual argument, stating that an expansion of municipal
services would have occurred had MCF been more com-
prehensive (which we, of course, do not observe). More-
over, the low cost-sharing rate (20 % of specialist service
costs paid by municipalities) is usually motivated by it
being an offset to the budgetary risks (e.g. in the face of
demographic change) of the smaller municipalities (com-
pared with the larger hospital catchment areas). Never-
theless, the argument is not very plausible. Even with a
higher cost-sharing rate, the consequences, apart from
heavy strains on local authorities’ revenues, could very
well be a heavier (short-term) reliance on (readily avail-
able) specialist capabilities and a weaker reliance on local
capabilities (i.e. costs of a “sunken” character going into
“shaky” investments in “longer-term” local services). In
other words, the argument may simply be that munici-
palities in Norway are too small for incentive schemes
such as the MCF to work. We return to this point in the
discussion.
4The DRGs are DRG-462A: Complex rehabilitation,
DRG-462B: Ordinary rehabilitation, DRG-462C: Other
rehabilitation, DRG-462O: Unspecified rehabilitation,
DRG-932O: Policlinic rehabilitation, and DRG-998O:
Group-based patient recovery. The choice of DRGs is
based on a presentation given by Vidar Halsteinli for the
Central Norway Regional Health Authority 29.09.2010.
5Nominal DRG prices (for the average DRG) in the
2010–2013 period are NOK 35,964 (2010), NOK 36,968
(2011), NOK 38,209 (2012), and NOK 39,447 (2013)
(Norwegian Directory of Health).
6While this is the average price per stay, as reported
by the South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Au-
thority (Helse Sør-Øst RHF), costs for rehabilitation
stays in private institutions vary considerably, with
the costliest stay priced at seven times the cheapest
stay. Unfortunately, we have presently not been able
to collect more precise data.
7A standard measure for “municipal rehabilitation ser-
vice” production is man-hours worked by physio- and
ergotherapists and psychiatric nurses as this “is assumed
to be closely related to rehabilitation”. In other words, the
measure is coarser than analogues at the specialist and
private level (where diagnoses, tasks, and procedures are
better defined and priced). Moreover, records are not
complete for a large proportion of the municipalities prior
to 2013. The measure that we utilize therefore relies on
the two former occupational groups (for which records
are the most complete).
8This constitutes 96 % of the 428 Norwegian muni-
cipalities. Missing values are most often associated
with incomplete municipal reporting to KOSTRA.
9Even though these results are weighted by municipal
population; a point to which we return below.
10Norwegian municipalities vary in population size
from just above 200 to well over 600,000 (Oslo), and the
median and mean population sizes stand at around 4500
and 12,000 respectively (2012).
11These are the exact predictions for relative changes,
i.e. exp(α)-1. For example, for the estimate of the α2012
effect this is exp(-0.15)-1 = 0.14. We report such exact
effects in the text.
12For example, for specialist services the estimate of
α2012-α2011 = -0.15-(-0.03) = -0.12 is significant at the p =
0.00 level, as are the analoguos differences for the other
service types.
13Although this pattern disappears with other specific-
tions (model variants (B) and (C); see below).
14This may suggest that the CR is an imprtant factor, if
not strictly the only important determinant of behavior,
in that pre- and post-reform trends are largely weak or
missing altogether.
15First stage results for two-stage least square estima-
tions are presented in Additional file 2: Table S2.
16For example, average (log) specialist service levels
change by α2012-α2011, estimated at -0.11-(-0.02) = -0.09
from 2011 to 2012 (z = 2.30, p = 0.022). In the case of mu-
nicipal rehabilitation services there are no signficant dif-
ferences between years whatsoever.
17In analyses in Table 3 we also cluster standard errors
at the municipality level.
18Although not very substantial, 2012–2013 changes, esti-
mated by jointly testing α0 + α2013, are significant at the 5 %
level for specialist and private services in model variant (D).
19Implemented by adding interaction terms between the
ΔNeeds and ΔYear variables to equation (2). Results for
interaction terms are shown in Additional file 3: Table S3.
20For other service types (private and municipal),
needs effects are alternately positive or negative, and
never significant.
21Conveniently, the additive α estimates may be inter-
preted as effects when the intreacted variable, the needs
variables, are zero. In other words, α estimates are Year
effects in the absence of needs changes.
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